Wealthy Deputies Legislating for Themselves: An Analysis of the Richest 1% in Brazil’s 57th Legislature

• Abstract:
• Introduction: The concentration of wealth among Brazilian parliamentarians raises fundamental questions about potential conflicts of interest in legislative activity and the quality of democratic representation. Methods: This study examines the richest 1% of the 57th Legislature (2023–2025), cross-referencing data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the Federal Revenue Service, the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), and the Chamber of Deputies to map assets, business networks, and legislative proposals of six deputies whose declared wealth ranges from R$48 to R$158 million. Results: All analyzed deputies are businesspeople who employ complex family holding structures, involving spouses and children in their business networks, and introduced 34 proposals aligned with their economic interests out of a total of 268. Companies linked to these parliamentarians signed contracts with the federal government totaling R$164.7 million during the legislature. Discussion: The findings highlight the structural interdependence of economic and political power in Brazil, revealing sophisticated strategies of self-interested lawmaking through broad sectoral regulatory initiatives, even though not all proposals became law.

*Image: Bruno Spada/Câmara dos Deputados